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Abstract
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solv-
ing large-scale problems; it was recently used
in breakthrough results for large-scale extensive-
form game solving. This was achieved by com-
posing simplex regret minimizers into an over-
all regret-minimization framework for extensive-
form game strategy spaces. In this paper we study
the general composability of regret minimizers.
We derive a calculus for constructing regret mini-
mizers for composite convex sets that are obtained
from convexity-preserving operations on simpler
convex sets. We show that local regret minimizers
for the simpler sets can be combined with addi-
tional regret minimizers into an aggregate regret
minimizer for the composite set. As one appli-
cation, we show that the CFR framework can be
constructed easily from our framework. We also
show ways to include curtailing (constraining)
operations into our framework. For one, they en-
ables the construction of CFR generalization for
extensive-form games with general convex strat-
egy constraints that can cut across decision points.
1. Introduction
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) (Zinkevich et al.,
2007), and its newer variants (Lanctot et al., 2009; Brown &
Sandholm, 2015a; Tammelin et al., 2015; Brown et al., 2017;
Brown & Sandholm, 2017a; 2019), have been a central com-
ponent in several recent milestones in solving imperfect-
information extensive-form games (EFGs). Bowling et al.
(2015) used CFR+ to near-optimally solve heads-up limit
Texas hold’em. Brown & Sandholm (2017c) used CFR
variants, along with other scalability techniques such as
real-time endgame solving (Ganzfried & Sandholm, 2015;
Burch et al., 2014; Moravcik et al., 2016; Brown & Sand-
holm, 2017b) and automated action abstraction (Brown &
Sandholm, 2014), to create Libratus, an AI that beat top hu-
man specialist professionals at the larger game of heads-up
no-limit Texas hold’em. Moravcˇı´k et al. (2017) also used
CFR variants and endgame solving to beat professional hu-
man players at that game.
CFR and its newer variants are usually presented as al-
gorithms for finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in
zero-sum EFGs. However, an alternative view is that it is a
framework for constructing regret minimizers for the types
of action spaces encountered in EFGs, as well as single-
agent sequential decision making problems with similarly-
structured actions spaces. Viewed from a convex optimiza-
tion perspective, the class of convex sets to which they apply
are sometimes referred to as treeplexes (Hoda et al., 2010;
Kroer et al., 2015; 2018). In this view, those algorithms
specify how a set of regret minimization algorithms for sim-
plexes and linear loss functions can be composed to form
a regret minimizer for a treeplex. Farina et al. (2019) take
this view further, describing how regret-minimization al-
gorithms can be composed to form regret minimizers for
a generalization of treeplexes that allows convex sets and
convex losses. This decomposition into individual optimiza-
tion problems can be beneficial because it enables the use
of 1) different algorithms for different parts of the search
space, 2) specialized techniques for different parts of the
problem, such as warm starting (Brown & Sandholm, 2014;
2015b; 2016) and pruning (Lanctot et al., 2009; Brown &
Sandholm, 2015a; Brown et al., 2017; Brown & Sandholm,
2017a), and 3) approximation of some parts of the space.
In this paper we introduce a general methodology for com-
posing regret minimizers. We derive a set of rules for how
regret minimizers can be constructed for composite convex
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sets via a calculus of regret minimization: given regret mini-
mizers for convex sets X ,Y we show how to compose these
regret minimizers for various convexity-preserving opera-
tions performed on the sets (e.g., intersection, convex hull,
Cartesian product), in order to arrive at a regret minimizer
for the resulting composite set. 1
Our approach treats the regret minimizers for individual
convex sets as black boxes, and builds a regret minimizer
for the resulting composite set by combining the outputs of
the individual regret minimizers. This is important because
it allows freedom in choosing the best regret minimizer for
each individual set (from either a practical or theoretical per-
spective). For example, in practice the regret matching (Hart
& Mas-Colell, 2000) and regret matching+ (RM+) (Tam-
melin et al., 2015) regret minimizers are known to perform
better than theoretically-superior regret minimizers such as
Hedge (Brown et al., 2017), while Hedge may give better
theoretical results when trying to prove the convergence rate
of a construction through our calculus.
One way to conceptually view our construction is as regret
circuits: in order to construct a regret minimizer for some
convex set X that consists of convexity-preserving opera-
tions on (say) two sets X1,X2, we construct a regret circuit
consisting of regret minimizers for X1 and X2, along with
a sequence of operations that aggregate the results of those
circuits in order to form an overall circuit for X . We use this
view extensively in the paper; we show the regret-circuit
representation of every operation that we develop.
As an application, we show that the correctness and con-
vergence rate of the CFR algorithm can be proven easily
through our calculus. We also show that the recent Con-
strained CFR algorithm (Davis et al., 2019) can be con-
structed via our framework. Our framework enables the
construction of two algorithms for that problem. The first
is based on Lagrangian relaxation, and only guarantees ap-
proximate feasibility of the output strategies. The second is
based on projection and guarantees exact feasibility, for the
first time in any algorithm that decomposes overall regret
into local regrets at decision points.
2. Regret Minimization
We will prove our results in the online learning framework
called online convex optimization (Zinkevich, 2003) (OCO).
In OCO, a decision maker repeatedly interacts with an un-
known environment by making a sequence of decisions x1,
1This approach has parallels with the calculus of convex sets
and functions found in books such as Boyd & Vandenberghe
(2004). It likewise is reminiscent of disciplined convex program-
ming (Grant et al., 2006), which emphasizes the solving of convex
programs via composition of simple convex functions and sets.
This approach has been highly successful in the CVX software
package for convex programming (Grant et al., 2008).
x2, . . . from a convex and compact set X ⊆ Rn. After each
decision xt, the decision maker faces a convex loss function
`t(xt), which is unknown to the decision maker until after
the decision is made. So, we are constructing a device that
supports two operations: (i) it provides the next decision
xt+1∈X and (ii) it receives/observes the convex loss func-
tion `t used to “evaluate” decision xt. The decision making
is online in the sense that the next decision, xt+1, is based
only on the previous decisions x1, . . . , xt and corresponding
observed loss functions `1, . . . , `t.
The quality of the device is measured by its cumulative
regret, which is the difference between the loss cumulated by
the sequence of decisions x1, . . . , xT and the loss that would
have been cumulated by playing the best-in-hindsight time-
independent decision xˆ. Formally, the cumulative regret up
to time T is
RT(X ,F) :=
T∑
t=1
`t(xt)− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
}
. (1)
Above we introduce the new notation of a subscript (X ,F)
to be explicit about the domain of the decisions {xt} and the
domain of the loss functions {`t}, respectively. This turns
out to be important because we will study composability of
devices with different domains.
The device is called a regret minimizer if it satisfies the de-
sirable property of Hannan consistency: the average regret
approaches zero, that is, RT(X ,F) grows sublinearly in T .
Formally, in our notation, we have the following definition.
Definition 1 ((X ,F)-regret minimizer). Let X be a con-
vex and compact set, and let F be a convex cone in the
space of bounded convex functions on X , and such that
F contains the space L of linear functions. An (X ,F)-
regret minimizer is a function that selects the next decision
xt+1 ∈ X given the history of decisions x1, . . . , xt and ob-
served loss functions `1, . . . , `t ∈ F , so that the cumulative
regret RT(X ,F) = o(T ).
2.1. Universality of Linear Loss Functions
Regret minimizers for linear loss functions are in a sense
universal: one can construct a regret minimizer for convex
loss functions from any regret minimizer for linear loss
functions (e.g., McMahan (2011)). The crucial insight is
that the regret that we are trying to minimize, RT(X ,F), is
bounded by the regret of a (X ,L)-regret minimizer that, at
each time t, observes as its loss function a tangent plane of
`t at the most recent decision xt. Thus we can minimize
RT(X ,F) by minimizing R
T
(X ,L).
Formally, let ∂`t(xt) be any subgradient of `t at xt. By
convexity of `t,
`t(xˆ) ≥ `t(xt) + 〈∂`t(xt), xˆ− xt〉 ∀ xˆ ∈ X ,
2
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and, substituting into (1), we obtain
RT(X ,F) ≤
T∑
t=1
〈∂`t(xt), xt〉 − min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
〈∂`t(xt), xˆ〉
}
, (2)
where the right hand side is RT(X ,L), the regret cumulated by
a device that observes the linear loss functions 〈∂`t(xt), · 〉.2
2.2. Connection to Convex-Concave Saddle-Point
Problems and Game Theory
In this subsection we review how regret minimization can
be used to compute solutions to regularized bilinear saddle-
point problems, that is solutions to problems of the form
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
{
x>Ay + d1(x)− d2(y)
}
, (3)
where X ,Y are closed convex sets, and d1, d2 are convex
functions. This general formulation allows us to capture,
among other settings, several game-theoretical applications
such as computing Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum
games. In that setting, d1 and d2 are the constant zero
functions, X and Y are convex polytopes whose description
is provided by the sequence-form constraints, and A is a
real payoff matrix (von Stengel, 1996).
In order to use regret minimization to solve problems of the
form (3), we consider the loss functions
`tX : X 3 x 7→ (−Ayt)>x+ d1(x),
`tY : Y 3 y 7→ (A>xt)>y + d2(y).
The error metric that we use is the saddle-point residual (or
gap) ξ of (x¯, y¯), defined as
max
yˆ∈Y
{d1(x¯)−d2(yˆ)+〈x¯, Ayˆ〉}−min
xˆ∈X
{d1(xˆ)−d2(y¯)+〈xˆ, Ay¯〉}.
The following folk theorem shows that the average of a
sequence of regret-minimizing strategies for the choice of
losses above leads to a bounded saddle-point residual (see,
for example, Farina et al. (2019) for a proof).
Theorem 1. If the average regret accumulated on X and
Y by the two sets of strategies {xt}Tt=1 and {yt}Tt=1 is 1
and 2, respectively, then the strategy profile (x¯, y¯) where
x¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t, y¯ = 1T
∑T
t=1 y
t has a saddle-point residual
bounded above by 1 + 2.
When d1 ≡ d2 ≡ 0 and X ,Y are the players’ sequence-form
strategy spaces, Theorem 1 asserts that the average strategy
2A downside of this approach is that (2) is an inequality, not
an equality. When we use a linearization of the loss function at
each decision point, we introduce error. This can cause regret to be
minimized more slowly than somehow working on the nonlinear
loss functions directly. Nevertheless, we obtain a regret minimizer
for the original problem.
profile produced by the regret minimizers is an (1 + 2)-
Nash equilibrium.
Different choices of the regularizing functions d1 and d2 can
be used to solve for strategies in other game-theoretic appli-
cations as well, such as computing a normal-form quantal-
response equilibrium (Ling et al., 2018; Farina et al., 2019),
and several types of opponent exploitation. Farina et al.
(2019) study opponent exploitation where the goal is to
compute a best response, subject to a penalty for moving
away from a precomputed Nash equilibrium strategy; this
is captured by having d1 or d2 include a penalty term that
penalizes distance from the Nash equilibrium strategy. Fa-
rina et al. (2017) and Kroer et al. (2017) study constraints
on individual decision points, and Davis et al. (2019) study
additional constraints on the overall EFG polytopes X ,Y.
Regret minimization in those settings requires regret min-
imizers that can operate on more general domains X ,Y
than the sequence form. In this paper we show how one
can construct regret minimizers for any convex domain that
can be constructed inductively from simpler domains using
convexity-preserving operations.
3. Regret Circuits
In this paper, we introduce regret circuits. They are com-
posed of independent regret minimizers connected by wires
on which the loss functions and decisions can flow. Regret
circuits encode how the inputs and outputs of multiple re-
gret minimizers can be combined to achieve a goal, in a
divide-and-conquer fashion, and help simplify the design
and analysis of regret-minimizing algorithms. Using the con-
structions that we will present, one can compose different
regret circuits and produce increasingly complex circuits.
The regret circuits approach has several advantages that
make it appealing when compared to other, more monolithic,
approaches. For one, by treating every regret minimizer that
appears in a regret circuit as an independent black box, our
approach enables one to select the best individual algorithm
for each of them. Second, our framework is amenable to
pruning or warm-starting techniques in different parts of the
circuit, and substituting one or more parts of the circuit with
an approximation. Finally, regret circuits can be easily run
in distributed and parallel environments.
We will express regret circuits pictorially through block
diagrams. We will use the following conventions when
drawing regret circuits:
• an (X ,F)-regret minimizer is drawn as a box
(X ,F)`
t−1 xt
3
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where the input (red) arrow represents the loss at a
generic time t− 1, while the output (blue) arrow repre-
sents the decision produced at time t;
• the symbol is used to denote an operation that con-
structs or manipulates one or more loss functions;
• the symbol is used to denote an operation that com-
bines or manipulates one or more decisions;
• the symbol denotes an adder, that is a node that
outputs the sum of all its inputs;
• dashed arrows denote decisions that originate from the
previous iteration.
As an example, consider the construction of Section 2.1,
where we showed how one can construct a regret minimizer
for generic convex loss functions from any regret minimizer
for linear loss functions. Figure 1 shows how that construc-
tion can be expressed as a regret circuit.
(X ,F)
(X ,L) x
t`t−1 〈∂`t−1(xt−1), · 〉
xt−1
Figure 1. Regret circuit representing the construction of an (X ,F)-
regret minimizer using an (X ,L)-regret minimizer.
4. Circuit Construction for Operations that
Enlarge or Transform Sets
In this section, we begin the construction of our calculus of
regret minimization. Given regret minimizers for two closed
convex sets X and Y, we show how to construct a regret
minimization for sets obtained via convexity-preserving op-
erations on X and Y . In this section, we focus on operations
that take one or more sets and produce a regret minimizer
for a larger set—this is the case, for instance, of convex
hulls, Cartesian products, and Minkowski sums.
As explained in Section 2.1, one can extend any (X ,L)-
regret minimizer to handle more expressive loss functionals.
Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we focus on (X ,L)-regret
minimizers.
4.1. Cartesian Product
In this section, we show how to combine an (X ,L)- and a
(Y,L)-regret minimizer to form an (X × Y,L)-regret min-
imizer. Any linear function ` : X × Y → R can be writ-
ten as `(x, y) = `X (x) + `Y (y) where the linear functions
`X : X → R and `Y : Y → R are defined as `X : x 7→ `(x, 0)
and `Y : y 7→ `(0, y). It is immediate to verify that
RT(X×Y,L) =
(
T∑
t=1
`tX (x
t)− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`tX (xˆ)
})
+
(
T∑
t=1
`tY (y
t)−min
yˆ∈Y
{
T∑
t=1
`tY (yˆ)
})
= RT(X ,L) +R
T
(Y,L).
In other words, it is possible to minimize regret on X ×Y by
simply minimizing it on X and Y independently and then
combining the decisions, as in Figure 2.
(X × Y,L)
(X ,L)
(Y,L)
xt
yt
(xt, yt)`t−1
`t−1(·, 0)
`t−1(0, ·)
Figure 2. Regret circuit for the Cartesian product X × Y .
4.2. Affine Transformation and Minkowski Sum
Let T : E → F be an affine map between two Euclidean
spaces E and F , and let X ⊆ E be a convex and compact
set. We now show how an (X ,L)-regret minimizer can be
employed to construct a (T (X ),L)-regret minimizer.
Since every y ∈ T (X ) can be written as y = T (x) for some
x ∈ X , the cumulative regret for a (T (X ),L)-regret mini-
mizer can be expressed as
RT(T (X ),L) =
T∑
t=1
(`t ◦ T )(xt)− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
(`t ◦ T )(xˆ)
}
.
Since `t and T are affine, their composition `tT := `
t ◦ T
is also affine. Hence, RT(T (X ),L) is the same regret as an
(X ,L)-regret minimizer that observes the linear function
`tT (·)− `tT (0) instead of `t.The construction is summarized
by the circuit in Figure 3.
(T (X ),L)
(X ,L) x
t T (xt)`t−1 `t−1T (·)− `t−1T (0)
Figure 3. Regret circuit for the image T (X ) of X under the affine
transformation T .
As an application, we use the above construction to form a
regret minimizer for the Minkowski sum X + Y := {x+ y :
x ∈ X , y ∈ Y} of two sets. Indeed, note that X + Y =
4
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σ(X × Y), where σ : (x, y) 7→ x+ y is a linear map. Hence,
we can combine the construction in this section together
with the construction of the Cartesian product (Figure 2).
See Figure 4 for the resulting circuit.
(X + Y,L)
(X ,L)
(Y,L)
xt
yt
+
xt + yt`t−1
Figure 4. Regret circuit for the Minkowski sum X + Y (Sec-
tion 4.2).
4.3. Convex Hull
In this section, we show how to combine an (X ,L)- and
a (Y,L)-regret minimizer to form a (co{X ,Y},L)-regret
minimizer, where co denotes the convex hull operation,
co{X ,Y} = {λ1x+ λ2y : x ∈ X , y ∈ Y, (λ1, λ2) ∈ ∆2},
and ∆2 is the two-dimensional simplex
∆2 := {(λ1, λ2) ∈ R2+ : λ1 + λ2 = 1}.
Hence, we can think of a (co{X ,Y},L)-regret minimizer as
picking a triple (λt, xt, yt) ∈ ∆2 ×X ×Y at each time point
t. Using the linearity of the loss functions,
RT(co{X ,Y},L) =
(
T∑
t=1
λt1`
t(xt) + λt2`
t(yt)
)
− min
λˆ∈∆2
xˆ∈X ,yˆ∈Y
{
λˆ1
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ) + λˆ2
T∑
t=1
`t(yˆ)
}
.
Now, we make two crucial observations. First,
min
λˆ∈∆2
xˆ∈X ,yˆ∈Y
{
λˆ1
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ) + λˆ2
T∑
t=1
`t(yˆ)
}
= min
λˆ∈∆2
{
λˆ1 min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
}
+ λˆ2 min
y∈Y
{
T∑
t=1
`t(yˆ)
}}
,
since all components of λˆ are non-negative. Second, the
inner minimization problem over X is related to the cu-
mulative regret RTX ,L) of the (X ,L)-regret minimizer that
observes the loss functions `t as follows:
min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
}
= −RT(X ,L) +
T∑
t=1
`t(xt).
(An analogous relationship holds for Y.) Combining the
two observations, we can write
RT(co{X ,Y},L) =
(
T∑
t=1
λt1`
t(xt) + λt2`
t(yt)
)
−min
λˆ∈∆2
{(
T∑
t=1
λˆ1`
t(xt)+λˆ2`
t(yt)
)
−
(ˆ
λ1R
T
(X ,L)+λˆ2R
T
(Y,L)
)}
.
Using the fact that min(f + g) ≥ min f + min g, and intro-
ducing the quantity
RT(∆2,L) :=
(
T∑
t=1
λt1`
t(xt) + λt2`
t(yt)
)
−min
λˆ∈∆2
{(
T∑
t=1
λˆ1`
t(xt) + λˆ2`
t(yt)
)}
,
we conclude that
RT(co{X ,Y},L) ≤ RT(∆2,L) + max{RT(X ,L), RT(Y,L)}. (4)
The introduced quantity, RT(∆2,L), is the cumulative regret
of a (∆2,L)-regret minimizer that, at each time instant t,
observes the (linear) loss function
`tλ : ∆
2 3 (λ1, λ2) 7→ λ1`t(xt) + λ2`t(yt). (5)
Intuitively, this means that in order to make “good decisions”
in the convex hull co{X ,Y}, we can let two independent
(X ,L)- and (Y,L)-regret minimizers pick good decisions
in X and Y respectively, and then use a third regret mini-
mizer that decides how to “mix” the two outputs. This way,
we break the task of picking the next recommended triple
(λt, xt, yt) into three different subproblems, two of which
can be run independently. Equation (4) guarantees that if all
three regrets {RT(∆2,L), RT(X ,L), RT(Y,L)} grow sublinearly,
then so does RT(co{X ,Y},L). Figure 5 shows the regret circuit
that corresponds to our construction above.
(co{X ,Y},L)
(X ,L)
(Y,L)
(∆2,L)
xt
xt−1
yt
yt−1
λt1x
t + λt2y
t`t−1 `
t−1
λ λt
Figure 5. Regret circuit for the convex hull co{X ,Y}. The loss
function `tλ is defined in Equation (5).
Extending to multiple set. The construction shown in Fig-
ure 5 can be extended to handle the convex hull co{X1, . . . ,Xn}
of n sets as follows. First, the input loss function `t−1 is fed
into all the (Xi,L)-regret minimizers (i = 1, . . . , n). Then,
the loss function `tλ, defined as
`tλ : ∆
n 3 (λ1, . . . , λn) 7→ λ1xt1 + · · ·+ λnxtn,
is input into a (∆n,L)-regret minimizer, where ∆n is the
n-dimensional simplex. Finally, at each time instant t, the n
decisions xt1, . . . , x
t
n output by the (Xi,L)-regret minimizers
are combined with the decision λt output by the (∆n,L)-
regret minimizer to form λt1x
t
1 + · · ·+ λtnxtn.
5
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V -polytopes. Our construction can be directly applied to
construct an (X ,L)-regret minimizer for a V -polytope X =
co{v1, . . . , vn} where v1, . . . , vn are n points in a Euclidean
space E. Of course, any ({vi},L)-regret minimizer outputs
the constant decision vi. Hence, our construction (Figure 5)
reduces to a single (∆n,L)-regret minimizer that observes
the (linear) loss function
`tλ : ∆
n 3 (λ1, . . . , λn) 7→ λ1`t(v1) + · · ·+ λn`t(vn).
The observation that a regret minimizer over a simplex can
be used to minimize regret over a V -polytope already ap-
peared in Zinkevich (2003) and Farina et al. (2017, Theo-
rem 3).
5. Application: Derivation of CFR
We now show that these constructions can be used to con-
struct the CFR framework. The first thing to note is that
the strategy space of a single player in an EFG is a treeplex,
which can be viewed recursively as a series of convex hull
and Cartesian product operations. This perspective is also
used when constructing distance functions for first-order
methods for EFGs (Hoda et al., 2010; Kroer et al., 2015;
2018). In particular, an information set is viewed as an
n-dimensional convex hull (since the sum of probabilities
over actions is 1), where each action a at the information set
corresponds to a treeplex Xa representing the set of possible
information sets coming after a (in order to perform the con-
vex hull operation, we create a new, larger representation of
Xa so that the dimension is the same for all a, described in
detail below). The Cartesian product operation is used to
represent multiple potential information sets being arrived
at (for example different hands dealt in a poker game).
Figure 6 shows an example. Each information set Xi (ex-
cept X0) corresponds to a 2-dimensional convex hull over
two treeplexes, one of which is always empty (that is, a
leaf node). Each is a Cartesian product. The top-most
represents the three possible hands that the player may
have when making their first decision. The second layer of
Cartesian products represent actions taken by the opponent.
The information-set construction is as follows: let I be the
information set under construction, and AI the set of actions.
Each action a ∈ AI has some, potentially empty, treeplex
Xa beneath it; let na be the dimension of that treeplex. We
cannot form a convex hull over {Xa}a∈AI directly since the
sets are not of the same dimension, and we do not wish to
average across different strategy spaces. Instead, we create
a new convex set X ′a ∈ R|AI |+
∑
a∈AI na for each a. The first
|AI | indices correspond to the actions in AI , and each Xa
gets its own subset of indices. For each x ∈ Xa there is a
corresponding x′ ∈ X ′a; x′ has a 1 at the index of a, x at the
indices corresponding to Xa, and 0 everywhere else. The
convex hull is constructed over the set {X ′a}a, which gives
X0
X3
X6
X2
X5
X1
X4
Start
Fold Call Fold Call Fold Call
Check Raise Check Raise Check Raise
Jack Queen King
Check Raise Check Raise Check Raise
Figure 6. Treeplex for the first player in the game of Kuhn poker.
Each Xi represents a convex hull over the treeplexes below, while
denotes the Cartesian product operation.
a1 an
XnX1
· · ·
co


{e1}
X1
{0}
...
{0}
,

{e2}
{0}
X2
...
{0}
, . . . ,

{en}
{0}
{0}
...
Xn


o1 on
XnX1
· · ·
X1 ×X2 × · · · × Xn
Figure 7. Inductive treeplex construction rules. ei ∈ Rn contains
a 1 at index i, and 0 everywhere else.
exactly the treeplex rooted at I. The Cartesian product is
easy and can be done over a given set of treeplexes rooted
at information sets I1, . . . , In. The inductive construction
rules for the treeplex are given in Figure 7. In fact, one
can prove that the `λ loss functions defined in Equation (5)
are exactly the counterfactual loss functions defined in the
original CFR paper (Zinkevich et al., 2007). If we use as our
loss function the gradient Ayt where yt is the opponent’s
strategy at iteration t, and then apply our expressions for
the Cartesian-product and convex-hull regrets inductively, it
follows from (5) that the loss function associated with each
action is exactly the negative counterfactual value. Finally,
the average treeplex strategy as per Theorem 1 coincides
with the per-information-set averaging used in standard CFR
expositions (e.g., (Zinkevich et al., 2007)).
6. Circuit Construction for Operations that
Constrain Sets
Unlike Section 4, in this section we deal with operations
that curtail the set of decisions that can be output by our
regret minimizer. Section 6.1 and 6.2 propose two differ-
ent constructions, and Section 6.3 discusses the merits and
drawbacks of the two.
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6.1. Constraint Enforcement via Lagrangian
Relaxation
Suppose that we want to construct an (X ∩{x : g(x)≤0},L)-
regret minimizer, where g is a convex function, but we only
possess an (X ,L)-regret minimizer. One natural idea is to
use the latter to approximate the former, by penalizing any
choice of x ∈ X such that g(x) > 0. In particular, it seems
natural to introduce the penalized loss function
˜`t : X 3 x 7→ `t(x) + βt max{0, g(x)},
where βt is a (large) positive constant that can change over
time. This approach is reminiscent of Lagrangian relaxation.
The loss function ˜`t is not linear, and as such it cannot be
handled as is by our (X ,L)-regret minimizer. However, as
we have observed in Section 2.1, the regret induced by ˜`t
can be minimized by our (X ,L)-regret minimizer if that
observes the “linearized” loss function
˜`t : X 3 x 7→ `t(x) + βt〈∂g(xt), x〉,
where βt :=
{
βt if g(xt) > 0
0 otherwise.
Figure 8 shows the regret circuit corresponding to the con-
struction described so far.
(X ∩ {x : g(x) ≤ 0},L)
(X ,L)
[xt−1]
+
`t−1 ˜`t−1
βt−1 〈∂g(xt−1), · 〉
xt
Figure 8. Regret circuit for the Lagrangian relaxation construction
(Section 6.1) for the constrained set X ∩ {x : g(x) ≤ 0}.
In the rest of this subsection we analyze in what sense small
cumulative regret implies that the constraint g(x) ≤ 0 is
satisfied. Let RT(X ,L) be the cumulative regret of our (X ,L)-
regret minimizer. Introducing Xg := X ∩ {x : g(x) ≤ 0} and
τg := {t ∈ {1, . . . , T} : g(xt)>0},
RT(X ,L) =
T∑
t=1
˜`t(xt)− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
˜`t(xˆ)
}
≥
T∑
t=1
`t(xt) +
∑
t∈τg
βtg(xt)
− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)+
(
T∑
t=1
βi
)
max{0, g(xˆ)}
}
≥
(
T∑
t=1
`t(xt)− min
xˆ∈Xg
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
)
+
∑
t∈τg
βtg(xt), (6)
where the first inequality is by (2) and the second inequality
comes from simply restricting the domain of the minimiza-
tion from X to Xg.3 Thus, if the βt are sufficiently large,
the average decision x¯ := 1B (β
1x1 + · · · + βT xT ) where
B := β1 + · · ·+ βT satisfies
max{0, g}(x¯) ≤ 1
B
T∑
t=1
βt max{0, g}(xt) = 1
B
∑
t∈τg
βtg(xt)
≤ 1
B
(
RT(X ,L) + min
xˆ∈Xg
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ− xt)
})
,
where the first inequality follows by convexity of max{0, g},
and the second inequality follows by (6).
If
∑T
t=1 βi  TLD, where L is an upper bound on the norm
of the loss functions `1, . . . , `T and D is an upper bound on
the diameter of X , then max{0, g(x¯)} → 0 as T → ∞, that
is, the constraint is satisfied at least by the average in the
limit. If L and D are known ahead of time, one practical
way to guarantee
∑T
t=1 βi  TLD is to choose βt = κLD
where κ > 0 is a large constant. This guarantees that in
the limit, small cumulative regret implies that the average
strategy approximately satisfies the constraint and satisfies
Hannan consistency. Formally:
Theorem 2. The decisions {xt} produced by a regret min-
imizer that observes loss functions {˜`t} where βt = κLD
satisfy the following two properties:
• Approximate feasibility: g
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xt
)
≤ 1
κ
+ o(1).
• Hannan consistency with respect to {`t}:
T∑
t=1
`t(xt)− min
xˆ∈Xg
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
}
= o(T ).
Alternatively, the βt can be chosen by a regret minimizer
which sees the constraint violation max{0, g(xt)} at time t
as its loss function.
6.2. Intersection with a Closed Convex Set
In this subsection we consider constructing an (X ∩ Y,L)-
regret minimizer from an (X ,L)-regret minimizer, where Y
is a closed convex set such that X ∩ Y 6= ∅. As it turns out,
this is always possible, and can be done by letting the (X ,L)-
regret minimizer give decisions in X , and then projecting
them onto the intersection X ∩ Y.
We will use a Bregman divergence D(y‖x) := d(y)− d(x)−
〈∇d(x), y − x〉 as our notion of (generalized) distance be-
tween the points x and y, where the distance generating
function (DGF) d is µ-strongly convex and β-smooth (that
3It may tempting to recognize in the term in parentheses in (6)
the cumulative regret of an(Xg,L)-regret minimizer. This would be
incorrect: the decisions xt are not guaranteed to satisfy g(xt) ≤ 0.
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is, d is differentiable and its gradient is Lipschitz continuous
with Lipschitz constant β). Our construction makes no fur-
ther assumptions on d, so the most appropriate DGF can be
used for the application at hand. When d(x) = ‖x‖22 we ob-
tain D(x‖y) = ‖x− y‖22, so we recover the usual Euclidean
distance between x and y. In accordance with our general-
ized notion of distance, we define the projection of a point
x ∈ X onto X ∩ Y as piX∩Y (x) = argmin
y∈X∩Y
D(y‖x). For ease
of notation, we will denote the projection of x onto X ∩ Y
as [x]; since X ∩ Y is closed and convex, and since D(·‖x)
is strongly convex, such projection exists and is unique. As
usual, the cumulative regret of the (X ∩ Y,L)-minimizer is
RT(X∩Y,L) =
T∑
t=1
`t([xt])− min
xˆ∈X∩Y
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ)
}
=
T∑
t=1
`t([xt]−xt)− min
xˆ∈X∩Y
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ−xt)
}
, (7)
where the second equality holds by linearity of `t. The
first-order optimality condition for the projection problem is
〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), xˆ− [xt]〉 ≤ 0 ∀ xˆ ∈ X ∩ Y.
Consequently, provided αt ≥ 0 for all t,
min
xˆ∈X∩Y
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ− xt)
}
≥ min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ− xt)
+
T∑
t=1
αt〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), xˆ− [xt]〉
}
. (8)
The role of the αt coefficients is to penalize choices of xt
that are in X \ Y. In particular, if
1
µ
T∑
t=1
`t([x
t]− xt) ≤
T∑
t=1
αt‖[xt]− xt‖2, (9)
then, by µ-strong convexity of d, we have
T∑
t=1
`t([x
t]−xt) ≤
T∑
t=1
αt〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), xt−[xt]〉. (10)
Substituting (10) and (8) into Equation (7) we get
RT(X∩Y,L) ≤
(
T∑
t=1
`t(xt) + αt〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), xt〉
)
− min
xˆ∈X
{
T∑
t=1
`t(xˆ) + αt〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), xˆ〉
}
,
which is the regret observed by an (X ,L)-regret minimizer
that at each time t observes the linear loss function
˜`t : x 7→ `t(x) + αt〈∇d(xt)−∇d([xt]), x〉. (11)
Hence, as long as condition (9) holds, the regret circuit of
Figure 9 is guaranteed to be Hannan consistent.
(X ∩ Y,L)
(X ,L) [x
t]
[xt−1]
piX∩Y
+
`t−1 ˜`t−1
αt−1〈∇d(xt−1)−∇d([xt−1]), · 〉
xt
xt−1
Figure 9. Regret circuit representing the construction of an (X ∩
Y,L)-regret minimizer using a (X ,L)-regret minimizer.
On the other hand, condition (9) can be trivially satisfied by
the deterministic choice
αt =

0 if xt ∈ X ∩ Y
max
{
0,
`t([xt]− xt)
µ‖[xt]− xt‖2
}
otherwise.
The fact that αt can be arbitrarily large (when xt and [xt]
are very close) is not an issue. Indeed, αt is only used in
˜`t (Equation 11) and is always multiplied by a term whose
magnitude grows proportionally with the distance between
xt and [xt]. In fact, the norm of the functional ˜`t is bounded:
‖˜`t‖ ≤ ‖`t‖+
∣∣∣∣ `t([xt]− xt)µ‖[xt]− xt‖2
∣∣∣∣ · ‖∇d(xt)−∇d([xt])‖
≤ ‖`t‖+ β
∣∣∣∣ `t([xt]− xt)µ‖[xt]− xt‖2
∣∣∣∣ · ‖[xt]− xt‖
≤ β(1 + µ)
µ
‖`t‖,
where the second inequality follows by β-smoothness of d.
In other words, our construction dilates the loss functions
by at most a factor β(1 + µ)/µ.
6.3. Comparison of the Two Constructions
As we pointed out, the decisions in the construction using
Lagrangian relaxation only converge to the constrained do-
main Xg on average. Thus, formally the construction does
not provide an (Xg,L)-regret minimizer, but only an approx-
imate one. Section 6.2 solves this problem by providing a
generic construction for an (X ∩ Y,L)-regret minimizer, a
strictly more general task. The price to pay is the need for
(generalized) projections, a potentially expensive operation.
Thus, the choice of which construction to use reduces to a
tradeoff between the computational cost of projecting and
the need to have exact versus approximate feasibility with
respect to g. The right choice depends on the application at
hand. Finally, the construction based on Lagrangian relax-
ation requires large penalization factors βt in order to work
properly. Therefore, the norm of ˜`t can be large, which can
complicate the task of minimizing the regret RT(X ,L).
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7. Application: Handling Strategy Constraints
When solving EFGs, there may be a need to add additional
constraints beyond simply computing feasible strategies:
• Opponent modeling. Upon observing repeated play
from an opponent, we may wish to constrain our model
of their strategy space to reflect such observations.
Since observations can be consistent with several in-
formation sets belonging to the opponent, this requires
adding constraints that span across information sets.
• Bounding probabilities. For example, in a patrolling
game we may wish to ensure that a patrol returns to its
base at the end of the game with high probability.
• Nash equilibrium refinement computation. Refine-
ments can be computed, or approximated, via per-
turbation of the strategy space of each player. For
extensive-form perfect equilibrium this can be done
by lower-bounding the probability of each action at
each information set (Farina & Gatti, 2017), which
can be handled with small modifications to standard
CFR or first-order methods (Farina et al., 2017; Kroer
et al., 2017). However, quasi-perfect equilibrium re-
quires perturbations on the probability of sequences of
action (Miltersen & Sørensen, 2010), which requires
strategy constraints that cross information sets.
All the applications above potentially require adding strat-
egy space constraints that span across multiple information
sets. Such constraints break the recursive nature of the
treeplex, and are thus not easily incorporated into standard
regret-minimization or first-order methods for EFG solv-
ing. Davis et al. (2019) propose a Lagrangian relaxation
approach called Constrained CFR (CCFR): each strategy
constraint is added to the objective with a Lagrangian mul-
tiplier, and a regret minimizer is used to penalize violation
of the strategy constraints. They prove that if the regret
minimizer for the Lagrange multipliers has the optimal La-
grangian multipliers as part of their strategy space, the av-
erage output strategy converges to an approximate solution
to the constrained game. They also prove a bound on the
approximate feasibility of the average output strategy when
their algorithm is instantiated with Regret Matching (Hart
& Mas-Colell, 2000) as the local regret minimizer at each
information set.
At least two alternative variants of CFR for EFGs with strat-
egy constraints can be obtained using our framework. First,
we can apply our method for Lagrangian relaxation of X and
a constraint g(x) ≤ 0. Our Lagrangian approach yields as
a special case the CCFR algorithm. Our approach supports
regret minimization for the Lagrangian multipliers, as was
done in CCFR, since we put no constraints on the form of
the βt multipliers. However, our approach is more general
in that it also allows instantiation with a fixed choice of
multipliers, thus obviating the need for regret minimization.
The second alternative is to apply our construction for the
intersection of convex sets (Section 6.2), which uses (gener-
alized) projection onto X ∩ {x : g(x) ≤ 0}. This leads to a
different regret-minimization approach, which has the major
advantage that all iterates are feasible, whereas Lagrangian
approaches only achieve approximate feasibility. The cost
of projection may be nontrivial, and so in general the choice
of method depends on the application at hand.
8. Conclusion and Future Research
We developed a calculus of regret minimization, which en-
ables the construction of regret minimizers for composite
convex sets that can be inductively expressed as a series of
convexity-preserving operations on simpler sets. We showed
that our calculus can be used to construct the CFR algorithm
directly, as well as several of its variants for the more general
case where we have strategy constraints. Our regret calculus
is much more broadly applicable than just EFGs: it applies
to any setting where the decision space can be expressed
via the convexity-preserving operations that we support. In
the future we plan to investigate novel applications of our
regret calculus. One potential application would be online
portfolio selection with additional constraints (e.g., expo-
sure constraints across industries); our framework makes it
easy to construct such a regret minimizer from any standard
online-portfolio-selection algorithm.
The approach presented in this paper has a large number
of potential future applications. For one, it would be in-
teresting to apply our approaches of including additional
constraints to the computation of quasi-perfect equilibria.
Currently the only solver that is fairly scalable is based on an
exact, monolithic, custom approach that uses heavy-weight
operations such as matrix inversion, etc. (Farina et al., 2018).
Our regret-minimization approach would be the first of its
kind for equilibrium refinement that requires constraints
that cut across information sets. It obviates the need for
the heavy-weight operations, and would still converge to
a feasible solution that satisfies an approximate notion of
quasi-perfect equilibrium. It would be interesting to study
this tradeoff between speed and solution quality.
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